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CASE NOTES

and a decided reluctance to face the problem of racial equality that is
provided for under the Constitution. As the Louisiana court decided in
the Wilson case, the Alabama court could have recognized as a class those
Negroes qualified to vote and possessing no disqualifications.
The court in the instant case was faced with none of these technicalities
but chose to circumvent the issue under the guise of judicial discretion.
Judicial discretion is that power of the court to determine a question of
fair judicial consideration with regard to what is right and equitable under
law and circumstances and should be directed by reason and conscience to
a just result. 7 It is submitted that substantial justice was not dispensed in

the instant case. The court may have deemed it prudent to defer the class
question due to the volatile nature of the issue. However practical it may
have seemed under the existing conditions to dismiss the question, the
affirmance of the trial court's decision seems to constitute a dereliction
from that standard of equality sought to be established by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Technically the decision is not subject to reversal because
there must be a clear cut abuse of discretion above and beyond the scope
of reason."
Unless the courts cease their practice of hiding behind the veil of discretionary power and bowing to local prejudices in cases involving racial
discrimination, final determination of these problems must be postponed
until such time as definitive rules are prescribed either by legislation or the
Supreme Court of the United States.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ILLINOIS PLUMBING
LICENSE LAW VOID
As citizens and taxpayers engaged in the business of selling hardware,
heating, and plumbing equipment at retail, the plaintiffs commenced an
action in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County against the defendants
who are state officers charged with enforcement of the Illinois Plumbing
License Law of 1951.1 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants
from the expenditure of public funds in the administration of such act,
contending that the act was unconstitutional. The circuit court entered
a decree finding the statute unconstitutional as violative of the due process
clause of the state Constitution, and the due process and equal protection
7

Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 16 A. 2d 861 (1941).

s Hartford Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 95 F. 2d 414 (C.A. 8th, 1938);
Blackhawk Motor Transit Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 383 111.57, 48 N.E.
2d 341 (1943); In re Loeb, 315 Mass. 191, 52 N.E. 2d 37 (1943); Alford v. Alford, 190

Ga. 562, 9 S.E. 2d 895 (1940); In re Garrett's Estate, 335 Pa. 287, 6 A. 2d 858 (1939);
Benedict v. Calkins, 19 Cal. App. 2d 416, 65 P. 2d 831 (1937).
1111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 111 , §§ 116.1-116.35.
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clauses of the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed
the decision of the lower court. Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E. 2d 169 (Ill.,
1953).
Whenever a business is affected with a public interest or is generally of
such nature as to be subject to regulation, it becomes subject to legislative control in all respects necessary to protect the public against danger,
injustice, and oppression. 2 However, a mere declaration by the legislature that a business is affected with a public interest is not conclusive
of the question whether its attempted regulation on that ground is
justified. a The matter is one which is always open to judicial inquiry. 4
In the Schroeder case, the general power of the state to regulate
plumbing and plumbers for the protection of the public health was not
disputed. The issue was whether, in the exercise of a power acknowledged
to exist, constitutional limitations had been transgressed.,
In People v. Broon,0 the Illinois Plumbing Law of 1935 was held unconstitutional. The plaintiffs contended that the same infirmities which had
rendered the act of 1935 unconstitutional were present in the 1951

statute.
The basis of the court's decision in the Brown case dealt with two
of the provisions in the 1935 act. One of the provisions required that
journeymen and apprentice plumbers be employees of master plumbers.
The court pointed out that although the legislature defined the trade of
a journeyman plumber and set down requirements for a license to practice said trade, the legislature through its act denied the journeyman
plumber the right to ply his trade freely by forcing him to find employment from a master plumber.
After hearing evidence from experts in the field, the court found that
the relationship of employer and employee between the master plumber
and the journeyman plumber was not necessary in order to protect
adequately the health, safety and welfare of the public. 7 This provision,
therefore, was held unconstitutional for the reason that:
2 Offield v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 203 U.S. 372 (1906); Friedenburg v. Times
Pub. Co., 170 La. 5, 127 So. 345 (1930); Public Service Commission v. Spokane &
I. E. R. Co., 89 Wash. 599, 154 Pac. 1110 (1916); State ex rel Star Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60 S.W. 91 (1900).
8 Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927);
Weller v. People, 268 U.S. 319 (1925); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus-

trial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); People ex rel Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra,
230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921).
4 Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
5Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E. 2d 169 (ILL., 1953).
6407 111. 565, 95 N.E. 2d 888 (1951).
7 "The fact that the act permits those groups to engage in the defined business of
plumbing constitutes an acknowledgment that the relationship of licensed master
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The legislature cannot invoke the police power to enact an unlawful
statute on the pretense of protecting public interests when the actual objective of the statute constitutes an arbitrary interference with private business
or imposes unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. If
such statute does not tend to preserve the public health, safety or welfare, it
is void as an invasion of individual property rights."
The other provision objected to by the court dealt with the requirements a person would have to meet in order to apply for a master
plumber's license. One of the conditions precedent in all cases was that
the applicant must have been employed by a master plumber for a certain
length of time. No matter how well qualified a person was through instruction, training and experience, he could never become a master
plumber unless he had been employed by a master plumber before his
application. The act did not impose on a licensed plumber the obligation
of employing a person who desired to enter into an apprenticeship.
Therefore, unless a master plumber so willed, a man could never of his
own choice or free will become a master plumber.
The court decided this provision violated the due process clause of the
Illinois Constitution which provides for the protection of a person's
business, profession, trade, occupation, labor and the avails of each. The
court recognized the fact that these rights might have to yield to the
inherent police power of the state when such police power was being
used to secure either the public health, welfare, morals or safety. 9 However, the court felt that the restraint imposed by the legislature upon a
person by requiring him to work for a master plumber before applying
for a master plumber's license was not a reasonable exercise of the police
power and as such was an invasion of individual property rights and a
violation of due process. 10
The court in the Brouw case took cognizance of the fact that a person
could, through proper training and experience, become qualified to
apply for a master's license without being required to seek employment
from a master plumber, the latter having the right to refuse him such
employment:
plumber employer and licensed journeyman plumber employee is not an indispensable condition precedent to the general supervision of the work of the journeyman
by the master." Ibid., at 575 and 894.
8 Ibid., at 573 and 893.
9 Munn v. People, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
10 People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 573, 95 N.E. 2d 888, 891 (1951): "The restraint
imposed upon a legitimate activity by an exercise of the police power for regulatory
purposes must be a reasonable one, be for the protection of the public health, safety,
comfort, or common welfare, and also be reasonably adopted to attain the objective
intended. .. "
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A law which deprives one class of persons of the right to acquire and
enjoy property, or to contract in relation thereto in the same manner as
others under like conditions and circumstances, is not comprehended within
the true meaning of the words 'due process of law."'
The Illinois Plumbing License Law of 195112 differed from the 1935

act in that it eliminated the requirement that journeymen and apprentice
plumbers be employees of master plumbers. However, substituted for
this provision was a requirement that master plumbers supervise all plumbing work done by journeymen or apprentices. 13 The defendants in the
Schroeder case argued that this change had cured the defect which
rendered the 1935 act unconstitutional while the plaintiffs contended that
the underlying vice of the 1935 statute was still present in the 1951 statute.

The court in the instant case decided that the substitution of the word
"supervision" by a master plumber for the former requirement of "employment," has the same economic effect. The master plumber still may
supervise or he may not as he sees fit. The employer-employee relationship which existed under the 1935 statute still exists under the
statute.

1951

The court concurred with the reasoning of the Brown case in finding
that the relationship of employer and employee between the master
plumber and the journeyman plumber was not necessary to protect
adequately the health, safety and welfare of the public, and that such
a requirement would only impose "an economic pattern which is
anachronistic today.' 1 4 The court took cognizance of the fact that economic relationships are not per se beyond the regulating powers of the
General Assembly' 5 but since the statute in its preamble recites that its
only concern is for the public health, 16 the court said:
The rigid hierarchy it imposes upon the plumbing business appears to be
an incidental, or accidental, appendage
to regulations aimed primarily at
17
protection of the public health.

Since the public health is not being enhanced through imposing
this rigid hierarchy upon the plumbing business, the act was uncon11 Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Jones, 384 Ill. 248, 253, 51 N.E. 2d 256, 259 (1943).
12111. Rev. Star. (1951) c. 11I1, § 116.4.
13

Ibid.

v. Binks, 113 N.E. 2d 169, 171 (1953).
Oak Woods Cemetary Ass'n v. Murphy, 383 111.301, 50 N.E. 2d 582 (1943).
1 111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 111, § 116.1. "To insure such skill and thereby protect
the public health, this act shall provide for the examination and licensing of Plumbers
by the State of Illinois."
14Schroeder
'5

17 Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E. 2d 169, 171 (I1., 1953).
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stitutional as violating the due process clause and Article 4, section 2218 of
the Illinois Constitution and the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Federal Constitution.
Another provision of the 195 1 act invalidated by the court was the one
dealing with the qualifications for applying for a master plumber's license. 19 Many of the barriers to securing a license which existed in the
1915 act had been substantially lowered in the 1951 act,2 0 but the court
was of the opinion that in essence the control of the master plumber over
access to the occupation still continued. The court said:
There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that the manual skills
at which the experience requirements appear to be aimed cannot be obtained
21
by methods other than the supervised experience which the act requires.
The court decided this provision violated the due process clause of
the Illinois Constitution and the due process and equal protection of the
laws clauses of the federal Constitution because of the monopolistic
control over the avenues of entry into the plumbing business which it
placed in the master plumber. Since the two provisions to which the
court objected were the essence of the act, the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that the entire act with the exception of section 20 which authorizes
22
municipal regulation of plumbing was unconstitutional.
Courts elsewhere have split in their decisions on the constitutionality
of regulations of the plumbing business similar to those here involved.
The decisions which have upheld such regulations have done so on
the theory that they are necessary in the light of the health and welfare
of the people, and that it is not unreasonable for municipal authorities
to pass statutes requiring all plumbing to be done by master plumbers or
those employed by him. 23 These courts do not go into the question of
18 Ill. Const., Art. IV, § 22. "The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws
in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: ... for granting to any corpo-

ration, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever."
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 111 , § 116.12.
20 Ibid.

Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E. 2d 169, 173 (Ill., 1953).
People v. Bartholf, 388 111. 445, 58 N.E. 2d 172 (1944); Winter v. Barrett, 352 111.
441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933): Where provisions held invalid are the essence of an act, the
entire act must fall.
23 "It is not unreasonable for municipal authorities to insist that the responsibility
for altering, repairing or making connections to any part of the plumbing system
in their cities shall be upon men of good repute, character and responsibility who
have a place of business in the city, who have passed an examination as to their competency in their trade and who may be personally found promptly and held to that responsibility, by the municipality or its residents, for acts of commission or omission
by themselves or those whom they have employed." People ex rel Stepski v. Harford,
21

22
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the constitutionality of the qualifications set down by the municipal
authorities as necessary in order to apply for a master plumber's license.
Other courts which have held similar legislation unconstitutional 2have
4
used the same line of reasoning as the court in the Schroeder case.
It is now well recognized that if a business or occupation is so concerned with the public health, safety, and welfare so as to come within
the police power, the aim of the legislature should be reasonable regulation for proper purposes and the exercise of the power cannot unduly
abridge the right of a citizen to pursue a lawful vocation.2 5 The split of
authority on the constitutionality of regulations such as contained in the
Illinois Plumbing Act of 1951, indicates that courts differ considerably
as to what is reasonable.
286 N.Y. 477, 484, 36 N.E. 2d 670, 673 (1941). "...
and one can hardly question the
power of the Legislature to impose such restraints and prescribe such requirements
as it may deem proper for the protection of the public against the evils resulting from
incapacity and ignorance." Roundtree Corporation v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 701,
708, 51 S.E. 2d 256, 261 (1949).
24 City of Sioux Falls v. Kadinger, 50 N.W. 2d 797 (S.D., 1951); Hench v. Michigan
State Plumbing Board, 289 Mich. 108, 286 N.W. 176 (1939); Benedetto v. Kern, 167
Misc. 831, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 844 (S.Ct., 1938); People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143, 90 N.E. 451

(1910).
25 City of Sioux Falls v. Kadinger, 50 N.W. 2d 797 (S.D., 1951).

